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1 Introduction
This paper pursues themes developed in my recent book The Dappled
World: A Study of the Boundaries of Science . (Cartwright 1999) . The book
is a Scotist book-in accord with the viewpoint of Duns Scotus . It extols
the particular over the universal, the diverse over the homogeneous and the
local over the global . Its central thesis is that in the world that science stud-
ies, differences turn out to matter . Correlatively, universal methods and
universal theories should be viewed with suspicion . We should look very
carefully at their empirical justification before we adopt them .
The topic in this volume is causality; I shall defend a particularist view
of our subject. Causal systems differ . What is characteristic of one is not
characteristic of all and the methods that work for finding out about one
need not work for finding out about another . I shall argue this here for one
specific characteristic : modularity . Very roughly, a system of causal laws is
modular in the sense I shall discuss when each effect in the system has one
cause all its own, a cause that causes it but does not cause any other effect
in the system. On the face of it this may seem a very special, probably rare,
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situation. But a number of authors currently writing on causality suppose
just the opposite . Modularity, they say, is a universal characteristic of causal
systems. I shall argue that they are mistaken .
2 What Is Modularity?
Behind the idea that each effect in a causal systems should have a cause of
its own is another idea, the idea that each effect in the system must be able,
to take any value in its range consistent with all other effects in the system
taking any values in their ranges. There are two standard ways in which
people seem to think this can happen; it will be apparent that different
senses of able are involved .
In the first place, a second collection of causal systems very similar to
the first may be possible in which all the laws are exactly the same except
for the laws for the particular effect in question . In the new systems these
laws are replaced by new laws that dictate that the effect take some specific
value, where the systems in the collection cover all the values in the range of
that effect .
This interpretation clearly requires that we be able to make sense of the
claim that an alternative set of laws is possible. For my own part I have no
trouble with this concept: in The Dappled World I argue that laws are not
fundamental but instead arise as the result of the successful operation of a
stable arrangement of features with stable capacities . Nevertheless, I do not
see any grounds for the assumption that the right kind of alternative ar-
rangements must be possible to give rise to just the right sets of laws to
make modularity true . At any rate this way of securing modularity is not my
topic in this paper .
The second way in which modularity might obtain is when each effect
in the system has a cause all of its own that can contribute to whatever its
other causes are doing to make the effect take any value in its range . This is
the one I will discuss here . I will also in this paper restrict my attention to
systems of causal laws that are both linear and deterministic . In this case the
commitment to modularity of the second kind becomes a commitment to
what I call "epistemic convenience" .
An epistemically convenient linear deterministic system is a system of
causal laws of the following form2
I I shall use "causal system" to refer to a set of causal laws and "causal structure" to refer to a
set of hypotheses about causal laws .
2 Somewhat more accurately, I should say "a system of laws generated by laws of the fol-
lowing form", for I take it that causal laws are transitive . For a more precise formulation, see
Cartwright (2000) .
x, c= U,
x2 c= a21x, + U2
xn c= Ean~x~ + Un
plus a probability measure P(u, . . .,un), where
i . there are no cross restraints among the u's 3 and the u's are probabilisti-
cally independent of each other ;
ii . for all j, Prob(u = 0) # 1 .
The symbol "c" shows that the law is a causal law . It implies both that
the relation obtained by replacing "c=" with "=" holds and that all the
quantities referred to on the right-hand side are causes of the one on the
left-hand side .
These systems are epistemically convenient because they make it easy
to employ randomized treatment/control experiments to settle questions
about causality using the method of concomitant variation . I will explain in
more detail below, but the basic idea can be seen by considering the most
straightforward version of the method of concomitant variation : to test if x~
causes xe and with what strength, use u to vary x,. while holding fixed all the
other u's, and look to see how xe varies in train. Conditions i) and ii) guar-
antee that this can be done .
A number of authors from different fields maintain that modularity 4 is
a universal characteristic of causal systems . This includes economic meth-
odologist Kevin Hoovers, possibly Herbert Simon (1977), economists T . F .
Cooley and Stephan LeRoy (1985), Judea Pearl (2000) in his new study of
counterfactuals, James Woodward (1997), Daniel Hausman (1998) and
Daniel Hausman and James Woodward (1999) jointly in a paper on the
causal Markov condition. I aim to show that, contrary to their claims, we
can have causality without modularity. I focus on the second kind of
modularity here in part because that is the kind I have found most explicitly
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3 Seen. 16 .
4 Or some closely related doctrine . Much of what I say can be reformulated to bear on various
different versions of a modularity-like condition .
5 See his defense of the invariance of the conditional probability of the effect on the cause in
Hoover (forthcoming) . In this discussion Hoover seems to suppose that there always is some
way for a single cause to vary and to do so without any change in the overall set of laws . At
other places, I think, he does not assume this . But he does speak with approval of Herbert
Simon's way of characterizing causal order, and Simon's charcterization requires the possi-
bility of separate variation of each factor .
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defended. Hence I shall be arguing that not all causal systems are epistemi-
cally convenient . 6
3 The Method of Concomitant Variation
We say that the method of concomitant variation is a good way to test a
causal claim. But can we show it? For an epistemically convenient system
we can, given certain natural assumptions about causal systems . That is one
of the best things about an epistemically convenient system-we can use
the method of concomitant variation to find out about it.
I shall not give the proof here, but rather describe some results we can
show.
Here are the assumptions I shall make about linear deterministic sys-
tems of causal laws :
A, : Functional dependence . Any causal equation re presents a true func-
tional relation.
A2: Anti-symmetry and irreflexivity . If q causes r, r does not cause q and q
does not cause q .
A3 : Uniqueness of coefficients . No effect has more than one expansion in
the same set of causes .
A4 : Numerical transitivity. Causally correct equations remain causally cor-
rect if we substitute for any effect any function in its causes that is
among nature's causal laws .
AS : Consistency.
Any two causally correct equations for the same effect
can be brought into the same form by substituting for effects in them
functions of their causes given in nature's causal laws .
A6: Generalized Reichenbach principle .
No quantities are functionally re-
lated unless the relation follows from nature's causal laws .
The result I shall describe says very roughly that when the underlying
linear deterministic system is an epistemically convenient one, then a causal
hypothesis is correct iff the method of concomitant variation says it is so . In
order to express this more precisely, we shall have to know what the form
of the causal hypotheses in question are, what it is for hypotheses of this
6 The authors mentioned here all have slightly different views, formulated and defended
differently and with different caveats . I apologize for lumping them all together. Clearly not
all the remarks I make are relevant to every view . In fact I will focus on a very specific form
of the claim for universal modularity . Nevertheless, most of what I say can be translated to
apply to other forms of the claim .
I
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form to be causally correct and what it is to pass the test for concomitant
variation .
The usual hypotheses on offer when we suppose the underlying causal
system to be linear and deterministic are in the form of regression equa-
tions :
R : xk c= lakJx'. + T
V
for 'Ilk 1 x, for all j,
where x 1 y means that <xy> = <x><y> .
What exactly does this hypothesis claim? I take it that the usual under-
standing is this : every quantity represented by a named variable (an "x") on
the right-hand side is a genuine cause of the quantity represented on the
left-hand side, and the coefficients are "right" . The random variable "'If"
represents a sum of not-yet-known causes that turn R into a direct repre-
sentation of one of the laws of the system . So I propose to define correct-
ness thus : an equation of the form R :
Xk
c= JakkxJ +'hk (1<_j<_m), for 'I' k 1 x,
is correct iff there exist { b'. } (possibly b, = 0), { q1 ' } such that qk c= lakjgJ +
jbj.%' + uk(l<_j<_m), where qq does not cause q1 ' . (This last restriction ensures
that all the omitted factors are causally antecedent to or "simultaneous"
with those mentioned in the regression formula . Note, x represents qj.)
Now let us consider concomitant variation . In an epistemically con-
venient linear deterministic system, the value of the x's are fixed by the u's,
and the u's can vary independently of each other. The core idea of the
method is to take the concomitant variation between x C and xe when uc var-
ies while all the other u's are fixed as a measure of the coefficient of x, in
nature's equation for xe .
To state the relevant theorems we shall need some notation . Let Lj(a)xn
=dfxn( u, = U,, . . . , uj , = Uj p uj = Uj+ a,
uj+1
	
Uj+,, . . . , u,n = Um) - xn( u, _
U,, . . . ,
UP]
=Uj_,, uj = U. uj+ , = Uj+ ,, . . . , u,n= U.) . Then we can prove8
Theorem 1 . A (true) regression equation x k c=
Ei=
, k-'akJ x,. + Wk, is causally
correct iff for all values of a and J, 1<_J<_k, AJ(a)xk = EakJO,(a)xj ; i.e. iff the
equation predicts rightly the differences in x k generated from variations in
any right-hand-side variable .
Notice,-however, that this theorem is not very helpful to us in making
causal inferences because it will be hard to tell whether an equation has
indeed predicted the differences rightly . That is because we will not know
7 Or when we are prepared to model the system as linear and deterministic for some reason or
another .
8 For a proof of the three theorems see Cartwright (2000, Ch . 3, also forthcoming in Philoso-
phy of Science.) . The formalization and proofs are inspired by the work of James Woodward
on invariance, which argues more informally for a more loosely stated claim . I am aiming to
make these claims more precise in these theorems .
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what 0,(a)x should be unless we know how variations in u, affect x i. and to
know that we will have to know the causal relations between x, and x,. . So in
order to judge whether each of the x, affects x k in the way hypothesized, we
will have already to know how they affect each other . If we happen to know
that none of them affect the others at all, we will be in a better situation,
since the following can be trivially derived from the previous theorem :
Theorem 2 . A (true) regression equation for x k
in which no right-hand side
variable causes any other is causally correct iff for all a and J, 0,(a)x k =
ak,0,(a)u, .
We can also do somewhat better if we have a complete set of hypothe-
ses about the right-hand-side variables . To explain this, let me define a
complete causal structure that represents an epistemically convenient linear
deterministic system with probability measure, as a triple, <X = {x1, . . .,x.J,
p., CLH>, where µ is a probability measure over X and where the causal law
hypotheses, CLH, have the following form :
X,
c= T,
x2 c= a21x1 +
T 2
Xn C=
;J=1n-1 anlxl
+ T
O
with L~ J xk, for all k < j . In general n < m, where m is the number of
effects in the causal system . Now I can formulate
Theorem 3 . If for all x k in a complete causal structure, the 0,(a)x k that actu-
ally obtains equals 0,(a)x k as predicted by the causal structure for all a and
J, 1<_15n, then all the hypotheses of the structure are correct .
I take it that it is the kind of facts recorded in these theorems that make
epistemically convenient systems so desirable, so that we might wish-if we
could have it-for all causal systems to be epistemically convenient . But is
it sensible to think they are? In the next section I will give some obvious
starting reasons for thinking the answer must be "no".
4 Three Peculiarities of Epistemic Convenience
To notice how odd the requirement of epistemic convenience is, let us look
first at some ordinary object whose operation would naturally be modeled
at most points by a system of deterministic laws-for instance a well-made
toaster like the one in Figure 1 9. The expansion of the sensor due to the heat
9 Figure 1 is drawn by Emily Cartwright following an explanation and illustration of the
functioning of a toaster in Macaulay (1988) .
The Toaster
Figure 1 .
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produces a contact between the trip plate and the sensor . This completes the
circuit, allowing the solenoid to attract the catch, which releases the lever .
The lever moves forward and pushes the toast rack open .
I would say that the movement of the lever causes the movement of the
rack. It also causes a break in the circuit . Where then is the special cause
that affects only the movement of the rack? Indeed, where is there space for
it? The rack is bolted to the lever . The rack must move exactly as the lever
dictates . So long as the toaster stays intact and operates as it is supposed to,
the movement of the rack must be fixed by the movement of the lever to
which it is bolted .
Perhaps, though, we should take the bolting of the lever to the rack as
an additional cause of the movement of the rack? In my opinion we should
not. To do so is to mix up causes that produce effects within the properly
operating toaster with the facts responsible for the toaster operating in the
way it does ; that is, to confuse the causal laws at work with the reason those
are the causal laws at work . 10 But even if we did add the bolting together at
this point as a cause, I do not see how it could satisfy conditions i) and ii) . It
does after all happen as part of the execution of the overall design of the
toaster, and hence it is highly correlated with all the other similar causes
that we should add if we add this one, such as the locating of the trip plate
and the locating of the sensor .
The second thing that is odd about the demand for modularity is where
it locates the causal nexus . It is usual to suppose that the fact that C causes
E depends on some relations between C and E . 11 Modularity makes it de-
pend on the relation between the causes of C and C : C cannot cause any-
thing unless it itself is brought about in a very special way .
Indeed, I think that Daniel Hausman embraces this view : " . . .people . . .
believe that causes make their effects happen and not vice versa . This belief
is an exaggerated metaphysical pun, which derives from the fact that people
can make things happen by their causes . This belief presupposes the possi-
bility of intervention and the claim that not all the causes of a given event
are nomically connected to one another" (Hausman 1998, 272) .
This is a very strong view that should be contrasted with the weaker
view, closer (on my reading) to that of Hume, that the concept of causation
arises because "people can make things happen by their causes", but that
this condition does not constitute a truth condition for causation . The
10 For a more complete discussion of this point, see the distinction between nomological
machines, on the one hand, and the laws that such machines give rise to, on the other, in
Cartwright (1999) .
11 Or perhaps, since C and E here pick out types and not particular events, "between C-type
events and E-type events" .
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weaker view requires at most that sometimes a cause of a cause of a given
effect -vary independently of all the "other" causes of that effect ; it does not
take epistemic convenience as universal . 12 In my opinion the weaker view
only makes sense as an empirical or historical claim about how we do in
fact form our concepts, and about that, we still do not have a reliable ac-
count. The stronger view just seems odd .
Thirdly, the doctrine seems to imply that it is impossible to build a
bomb that cannot be defused. Nor can we make a deterministic device of
this sort: the correct functioning of the mechanisms requires that they oper-
ate in a vacuum; so we seal the whole device in a vacuum in such a way
that we cannot penetrate the cover to affect one cause in the chain without
affecting all of them . Maybe we cannot build a device of this sort-but why
not? It does not seem like the claim that we cannot build a perpetual motion
machine. On the doctrine of universal epistemic convenience we either have
to say that these devices are indeed impossible, or that what is going on
from one step to the next inside the cover is not causation, no matter how
much it looks like other known cases of causation or passes other tests for
causation (such as the transfer of energy/momentum test or the demand that
a cause increase the probability of its effects holding fixed a full set of other
causes) .
Given that the claim to empirical convenience as a universal condition
on causality has these odd features, what might motivate one to adopt it?
Three motivations are ready to hand
: we might be moved by operationalist
intuitions, or by pragmatist intuitions or we might be very optimistic about
how nicely the world is arranged for us . I will take up each in turn .
5 Motivations for Epistemic Convenience : Excessive'
Operationalism
This is a hypothesis of Arthur Fine's13 : Advocates of modularity conflate
the truth conditions for a causal claim with conditions which
were they to
12 It is also surprising that Hausman focuses on the supposition of (something like) epistemic
convenience as a necessary condition, but does not stress the equally problematic matter of
the possibility of choice
. We all know the classic debate about free will and determinism : it
looks as if people cannot make things happen by their causes unless the causes of the causes
are not themselves determined by factors outside our will, and that in turn looks to preclude
universal determinism . If that should follow, it would not trouble me, but many advocates of
modularity also defend the causal Markov condition-which I attack-on the grounds of
universal determinism. Moreover, the need for us to cause some of the causes at least some of
the time seems equally necessary whether one takes the strong view that Hausman maintains
or the weaker view-which does not require epistemic convenience as a truth condition-that
I described as closer to Hume .
13 Conversation, May, 2000, Athens, Ohio .
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obtain would make for a ready test . As we have seen, a central feature of
deterministic systems that are epistemically convenient is that we can use
the simplest version of the method of concomitant variation within them : to
test "x e cause Xe", consider situations in which x
C
varies without variation in
any `other' causes of xe and look for variation in xe . I think this is particu-
larly plausible as a motivation for economists. Economists in general tend
to be very loyal to empiricism, even to the point of adopting operationalism .
For instance, they do not like to admit preferences as a psychological cate-
gory but prefer to use only preferences that are revealed in actions .
In general, versions of operationalism that elevate a good test to a truth
condition are in disfavour. Still we need not dispute the matter here, for,
even were we disposed to this kind of operationalism in the special case at
hand, it would not do the job. Simple concomitant variation is no better test
than many others-including more complicated methods of concomitant
variation. So operationalism will not lead us to limit causal concepts to
systems that admit tests by simple concomitant variation at the cost of other
kinds of systems . In particular, the simple method does not demand any
`less' 14 background knowledge than tests using more complicated versions
of concomitant variation, which can be performed on other kinds of deter-
ministic systems, nor knowledge of a different kind .
Let me illustrate . We will continue to look at linear deterministic sys-
tems and we will still assume that all exogenous factors are mutually un-
constrained : there are no functional relations among them . 15 And we will
still test for causal relations by the method of concomitant variation .
Imagine then that we wish to learn the overall strength, if any, of x, 's
capacity to affect xe , where we assume we know some cause u l that has a
known effect (of, say, size b) on x, and whose variation we can observe. In
the general case where we do not presuppose epistemic convenience, every
candidate for u, may well affect x e by other intermediaries, say x 2, . . .,x,, as
well. Suppose the overall strength of its capacity to affect x, is b . and of x, to
affect xe is ci .
We aim to compare two different situations, which are identified by the
values assigned to the u's : S <U,,U2, . . . . Um> and S' = <U,' U,,U2, . . .,Um>,
where the u's constitute a complete set of mutually unconstrained exoge-
nous factors that determine x e . Then
14 I put "less" in scare quotes because I do not mean to get us involved in any formal notions
of more and less information .
15 If they are constrained, re-express all of them as appropriate functions of a further set of
mutually unconstrained factors . Notice that this has no implications one way or another about
whether, for example, two endogenous factors share all the same exogenous causes . The point
of this is to allow that the exogenous factors can vary independently of each other .
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X
e
'-X = E.=1mbjcj(U1
U)~
	
I
or, letting (Ej=2mbjc)/b, =df A,
(xe'-xe)/b,(U,'-U,) = c,+A.
Now here is the argument we might be tempted to give in favour of
epistemically convenient systems . If we have an epistemically convenient
system, A = 0, so c, = X"-xe/b,(U,'-U) . Otherwise we need to know the
value of A. So we need less antecedent knowledge if our systems are epis-
temically convenient .
But clearly the last two sentences are mistaken : A = 0 is just as much a
value of A as any other; to apply the method of concomitant variation, we
need to know (or be willing to bet on) the value of A in any case . Some-
times there may be some factor u, for which it is fairly easy to know that its
effect on x e by routes other than x, is zero . This for example, is, in my
opinion, the case with J.L. Mackies's famous hypothesis that the sounding
of the end-of-workday hooters in Manchester brings the workers out onto
the streets in London. Here we know various ways to make the hooters in
Manchester sound of which we can be fairly confident that they could not
get the workers in London out except via making the Manchester hooters
hoot.
16
But equally, sometimes we may know for some exogenous factors that
do affect xe by routes other than x, what the overall strength of that effect
is-if, for instance, we have data on variations in xe given variations in u,
when the route from u, to x, is blocked .
Let us review some of the prominent facts we would need to know for
a brute force application of the method of concomitant variation, as I have
described it, in a linear deterministic system. To test "x, causes x e with
strength c" we need to know
1 . of a factor u, that it is exogenous to the system under study, that it
causes x, and with what strength it does so ;
2. of a set of factors that they are exogenous, that they are mutually un-
constrained, and that together, possibly including u,, they are sufficient
to fix xe but not sufficient to fix u, ;
3 . what would happen to
Xe
in two different situations for which the val-
ues of the exogenous factors described in 2 . do not vary, except for the
value of u,, which does vary ;
4. the overall strength of u,'s capacity to affect x e by other routes than by
causing x, .
16 For a discussion, see Cartwright (1989) .
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My point here is that we need to know (or find a way around knowing) all of
this information whether or not the system is epistemically convenient .
Why then have I called these special kinds of systems "epistemically
convenient" for use of the method of concomitant variation if we need to
know (or find our way around knowing) "the same amount" of information
to use the method whether the system is epistemically convenient or not?
Because when the system is epistemically convenient, it is a lot easier to use
randomized treatment/control experiments
. That is why I have called these
systems "epistemically convenient" ; and it is one of the chief arguments
James Woodward (2000, p. 10) gives in favour of the claim that causal
systems should be epistemically convenient :
A manipulationist approach to causation explains the role of
experimentation in causal inference in a very simple and straight-
forward way
: Experimentation is relevant to establishing causal
claims because those claims consist in, or have immediate impli-
cations concerning, claims about what would happen to effects un-
der appropriate manipulations of their putative causes
. In other
words, the connection between causation and experimentation is
built into the very content of causal claims .
Randomized treatment/control experiments provide us with a powerful
tool to find our way around knowing large chunks of information we oth-
erwise would need to know
. For the point at issue in this paper, we need to
be clear about which features of the stock experimental structure help with
which aspects of our ignorance .
Randomization allows us to finesse our lack of knowledge of the kinds
of facts described in 2 . above
. When we are considering the effect of u, on
xe ,
we generally do not know a set of "otherf" exogenous factors sufficient to
fix xe .
But a successful randomization ensures that they will be equally dis-
tributed in both the treatment and the control groups
. Hence there will be no
background correlations between these other factors that might confound
our results. Observing the outcome in the two groups allows us to find out
(roughlyl
7
) the information we look for in 3 .
: what happens under variation
in u, .
But notice that randomization and observation do these jobs whether or
not the system is epistemically convenient
. Epistemic convenience matters
17
The experiment does not allow us to tell what happens for any two specific situations (i .e .,
any specific choice of values for the u,) but only certain coarser facts
. For instance, if u, is
causally unanimous across all situations (i .e .,
it is either causally positive across all, or caus-
ally negative or causally neutral), for a two-valued outcome, x
e , it can be shown that the prob-
ability of x e in the treatment group is respectively greater than, less than or equal to that in the
control group iff u, is causally positive, negative or neutral with respect to x, .
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because we were trying to find out, not about the effects of u,, but rather
about the effects of x, . In the case I described above, where epistemic con-
venience fails, u, has multiple capacities : it can affect xe differently by dif-
ferent routes . We are interested only in its effect via x
1 , which we shall use
to calculate the effect of x, itself . 18 Randomization does not help with this
problem . Just as in the brute force application of concomitant variation, we
need either to find a cause of x l which we know has no other way of af-
fecting x e , or we need to know the overall effect via other routes in order to
subtract it away .
The placebo effect is a well-known example of this problem . Getting
the experimental subjects to take the medicine not only causes them to have
the medicine in their bodies . It can also affect recovery by producing vari-
ous psychological effects-feeling cared for, optimism about recovery, etc .
This is a good example to reflect on with respect to the general ques-
tion of how widespread epistemically convenient systems are . How do we
canonically deal with the placebo effect? We give the patients in the control
group some treatment that is outwardly as similar to the treatment under test
as possible but that is known to have no effect on the outcome under study .
That is, we do not hunt for yet another way to get the medicine into the
subjects, a way that does not affect recovery by any other route . Rather we
accept that our methods of so doing may affect recovery in the way sug-
gested (or by still other routes) and introduce another factor into the control
group that we hope will just balance whatever these effects (if any) may be .
Ironically then, the standard procedure in these medical experiments does
not support the claim that there is always a way to manipulate the cause we
want to test without in any other way affecting the outcome . Epistemic con-
venience definitely makes randomized treatment/control experiments easier,
but there are vast numbers of cases in which we do not rely on it to hold .
6 Motivations for Epistemic Convenience : `Excessive'
Pragmatism
This is a hypothesis raised by the students in my Ph .D . seminar on causality
in economics at LSE : Advocates of modularity elevate a plausible answer to
the question "Of what use to us is a concept of causation?" into a truth con-
dition. This motivation is explicitly acknowledged by Daniel Hausman
18 It may be just worth reminding ourselves, so as not to confuse the two issues, that x, itself
may have multiple capacities with respect to x e . Simple randomized treatment / control ex-
periments do not disentangle these various capacities but rather teach us about the overall
effect of x, on x e .
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(1998, 96-97) in defense of a similar condition to the one we are investi-
gating :
What do people need causal explanations or a notion of causation
for? Why isn't it enough to know the lawlike relations among
types? Because human beings are actors, not just spectators .
Knowledge of laws will guide the expectation of spectators, but it
does not tell actors what will result from their interventions . The
possibility of abstract intervention is essential to causation . . .
My remarks here are identical to those about operationalism . Whether
or not we wish to adopt the pragmatic justification as a truth condition, it
will not do the job of defending modularity as a truth condition . Consider
the same example as above . The conditions for using variations in u, to
produce variations in x, and thereby to obtain predictable variations in xe
are much the same as the conditions for testing via concomitant variation .
To know what we will bring about in xe by manipulating u, it is not
enough to know just the influence of u, on x, and of x, on x e . We also need
to know the overall influence of u, on x e by all other routes . Knowing that
the size of influence by other routes is zero is just a special case . Whatever
its value, if we know what the value is we can couple this knowledge with
our knowledge of the influence of u, via x, to make reliable predictions of
the consequences of our actions . So we do not need modularity to make use
of our causal knowledge .
There is, however, a venerable argument for a different conclusion
lurking here . If we are to use our causal knowledge of the link from x, to
bring about values we want for x e , it seems that some cause or other of x,
must not itself be deterministically fixed by factors independent of our
wishes: there must be some causes of x, that we can genuinely manipulate .
But again, whether or not this is a good argument, it does not bear on
modularity. To make use of our knowledge of the causal link between x,
and xe we may need a cause of x, that we can manipulate; but that does not
show that we need a cause we can manipulate without in any other way
affecting x e .
7
Motivations for Epistemic Convenience : `Excessive' Op-
timism
This is my hypothesis . Life becomes easier in a number of ways if the sys-
tems we study are economically convenient . Statistical inference of the
strengths of coefficients in linear equations can become easier in well-
known ways. So too can causal inference, in ways I have discussed here .
And, as we shall see, Judea Pearl can provide a very nice semantics for
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counterfactuals as well as for a number of distinct causal notions . Wishful
thinking can lead us to believe that all systems we encounter will meet the
conditions that make life easier . But wishful thinking must be avoided here,
or we will be led into the use of methods that cannot deliver what we rely on
them for .
I think we can conclude from these considerations that these three mo-
tivations do not provide strong enough reason to accept universal economic
convenience . What positive arguments then are on offer on its behalf?
8 For and Against Economic Convenience
8.1 Hausman's Defense
Daniel Hausman points out that the cause we focus on is not generally the
complete cause . A complete cause will include both helping factors and the
absence of disturbances . Even if effects share the causes we normally focus
on (e.g., in the toaster in Figure 1, the breaking of the circuit and the moving
of the rack are both caused by the motion of the lever), they will not share
all of these other factors, Hausman maintains .
Disturbing factors . This claim seems particularly plausible with respect
to disturbing factors. Most of the effects we are modeling here are fairly
well separated in time and space. So it seems reasonable to expect that some
things that might disturb the one would not disturb the other . This seems
promising for the thesis of, if not universal, at least widespread, epistemic
convenience. But there is a trouble with disturbing factors : often what they
do is to disrupt the relation between the causes and the effect altogether . To
salvage economic convenience, they need instead to cooperate with the
causes adding or subtracting any spare influence necessary to ensure that
the effect can take all the values in its allowed range . So they do not seem
to satisfy reliably the conditions for epistemic convenience .
Helping factors . Return to the toaster . The motion of the lever causes
the motion of the rack. That of course depends on the fact that the lever is
bolted solidly to the rack : if the lever were not bolted to the rack, the lever
could not move the rack . Could we not then take the fact that the lever is
bolted to the rack to be just what we need for the special cause of the mo-
tion of the rack, a cause that the motion of the rack has all to itself?
I think not, for a number reasons :
1 . As I urged in section 4, the fact that the two are bolted together is not
one of the causes within the system of causal laws but rather part of the
identification of what that systems of laws applies to, and this identifi-
cation matters . We do not, after all, seek to know what the causal law is
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that links the movement of levers in general with the movement of
racks of the right shape to contain toast. Surely there is no such law .
Rather we want to know the causal relation, if any, between the move-
ment of the lever and the movement of the rack in a toaster of this par-
ticular design . Without a specific design under consideration, the ques-
tion of the causal connection, or lack of it, between levers and racks is
meaningless .
2 . Let us, however, for the sake of argument, admit as a helping cause in
the laws determining the motion of the rack the fact that the lever and
rack are bolted together. My second worry about calling on helping
factors like this to save epistemic convenience depends on the prob-
ability relations these factors must bear to each other . In section 4, I
queried whether these factors would be probabilistically independent of
each other. Here I want to ask a prior question . Where is the probability
distribution over these factors supposed to come from and what does it
mean?
We could consider as our reference class toasters meeting the specific
set of design requirements under consideration . Then the probabilities
for all of these "helping factors" being just as they are could be defined
and would be 1 . Independence would be trivially obtained, but at the
cost of the kind of variation we need in the values of the u's to guaran-
tee, via our theorems, that concomitant variation will give the right ver-
dicts about causality .
Alternatively the reference class could be the toasters produced in a
given factory following the designated design . Presumably then there
would be some faults some time in affixing the lever to the rack so that
not all the u's would have probability 1 . But will the faults be inde-
pendent? If not this reference class, then what? It will not do to have a
make-believe class, for how are we to answer the question : if the at-
tachment of the lever to the rack were to vary, what would happen to
the rack? We need some other information to tell us that-most usu-
ally, I would suppose, knowledge of the causal connections in the
toaster! And if not that information exactly, I bet it would nevertheless
be information sufficient to settle the causal issue directly, without de-
tour through concomitant variations .
3 . The third worry is about the range of variation . For the theorems to
guarantee the reliability of the method of concomitant variation, we
need u's that will take the cause under test through its full range rela-
tive to the full range of values for the other causes . Otherwise there
could be blips-the causal equation we infer is not true across all the
values but depends on the specific arrangement of values we consider .
Will the factors we pick out have a reasonable range of variation? This
remark applies equally well to disturbing factors .
4. Last I should like to point out two peculiarities in the way people often
talk about the factors designated by the u's . Often they are supposed not
only to represent the special causes peculiar to each separate effect but
also all the "unknown" factors we have not included in our model . But
if they are unknown, they can hardly be of use to us as handles for ap-
plying the method of concomitant variation . And if epistemically con-
venient systems are not going to be of epistemic convenience after all,
why should we want them? I realize that the issue here is not supposed
to be whether we want systems of this kind, but rather whether we have
them. Still in cases like this where the answer is hard to make out, the
strategy should be to ask "What depends on the answer" . That is the
reasonable way to establish clear criteria for whether a proffered answer
is acceptable or not .
The second peculiarity arises from talking of the u's as a "switch" that
turns the cause to different values . Often it is proposed that the switch is
usually "off' yet could be turned on to allow us to intervene . This raises
worries about the independence requirements on the u's again . Why
should that kind of factor have a probability distribution at all, let alone
one that renders it independent of all the other switch variables?
8.2 Pearl's Defense
Judea Pearl supposes that modularity holds in the semantics he provides for
singular counterfactuals . He claims that, without modularity, counterfactu-
als would be ambiguous . 19 So modularity must obtain wherever counter-
factuals make sense. This will double as an argument for universal modu-
larity if we think that counterfactuals make sense in every causal system .
Pearl assumes modularity of the first kind, where alternative causal
systems of just the right kind are always possible, but I can explain some-
thing of how the semantics works using the epistemically convenient sys-
tems we have been studying here . We ask, for instance, in a situation where
xi. = X and xk = Xk, "Were x, = N+A, would
Xk
= Xk+akJ0?" The question
may be thought ambiguous because we do not know what is to stay fixed as
xk varies. Not so if we adopt the analogue of Pearl's semantics for our
epistmically convenient system. In that case a must vary in order to pro-
duce the required variation in xi and all the others u's must stay the same .
MODULARITY: IT CAN-AND GENERALLY DOES-FAIL / 8 1
19 14 March, 2000, seminar presentation, Dept . of Philosophy, University of California at
San Diego .
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The semantics Pearl offers is very nice, but I do not see how it func-
tions as an argument that counterfactuals need modularity . The counterfac-
tuals become unambiguous just because Pearl provides a semantics for
them and because that semantics always provides a yes-no outcome . Any
semantics that does this will equally make them unambiguous .
Perhaps we could argue on Pearl's behalf that his is the right semantics,
and it is a semantics that is not available in systems that are not epistemi-
cally convenient . Against that we have all the standard arguments that
counterfactuals are used in different ways, and Pearl's semantics-like oth-
ers-only accounts for some of our uses . We should also point out that we
do use, and seem to understand, counterfactuals in situations where it is in
no way apparent that the causal laws at work are epistemically convenient .
I think one defense Pearl may have in mind concerns the connection
between counterfactuals and causality. Consider a very simple case where
one common cause, v, is totally responsible both for x,and x2 and no u, is
available to vary x, independently of v .20
It is easy to construct a semantics, similar indeed to the one Pearl does
construct, that answers unambiguously what would happen to x 2 if x, were
different. This semantics would dictate that we vary v to achieve the varia-
tion in x, . Then of course x2 would vary as well . So it would be true that
were x, to be different, x 2 would be. And that seems a perfectly reasonable
claim for some purposes . But not of course if we wish to read singular
causal facts from our counterfactuals . So Pearl could argue that his seman-
tics for counterfactuals connects singular counterfactuals and singular
causal claims in the right way . And his semantics needs modularity. So
modularity is a universal feature wherever singular causal claims make
sense .
Laying aside tangled questions about the relations between singular
causal claims and causal laws, which latter are the topic of this paper, I still
do not think this argument will work .
We could admit that for an epistemically convenient system Pearl's
semantics for counterfactuals plus the counterfactual-causal links he lays
out will give correct judgments about causal claims. We could in addition
admit that causal claims cannot be judged by this method if the system is
not epistemically convenient . All this shows is that methods that are really
good for making judgments in one kind of system need not work in another
kind.
More strongly, we could perhaps somehow become convinced that no
formal semantics for causal claims that works, as Pearl's does, by trans-
20 For Pearl this would mean that there was no alternative causal system possible that sub-
stituted the law "Let x, =X," for the law connecting x, and v .
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forming a test into a truth condition, will succeed across all systems of laws
that are not epistemically convenient. That would not show that there are no
causal laws in those systems, but merely that facts about causal laws are not
reducible to facts about the outcomes of tests .
9
Conclusion
Modularity is not a universal feature of deterministic causal systems, nice as
it would be were it universal . Part of my argument for this conclusion de-
pends on asking of various factors, such as the fact that the toaster rack is
bolted to the lever, "Are these really causes?" I argued that they are not
because they cannot do for us what we want these particular kinds of causes
to do
. In this case what we want is a guarantee that if we use these factors in
applying the method of concomitant variation, the results will be reliable .
I think this is the right way to answer the question . We should not sit
and dispute whether a certain factor in a given situation is really a cause, or
what causality really is . Rather we should look to whether the factor will
serve the purposes for which we need a "cause" on this occasion . That
means, however, that for different purposes the very same factor function-
ing in the very same way in the very same context will sometimes be a
cause and sometimes not .
That is all to the good. Causality is a loose cluster concept . We can say
causes bring about their effects, but there are a thousand and one different
roles one factor can play in bringing -about another . Some may be fairly
standard from case to case ; others, peculiar to specific structures in specific
situations . Causal judgements, and the methods for making them reliably,
depend on the use to which the judgment will be put. I would not, of
course, want to deny that there may be some ranges of cases and some
ranges of circumstances where a single off-the-shelf concept of causality, or
a single off-the-shelf method, will suffice . But even then, before we invest
heavily in any consequences of our judgments, we need strong reassurance
both that this claim is true for the ranges supposed and that our case sits
squarely within those ranges .
That of course makes life far more difficult than a once-and-for-all
judgment, a multipurpose tool that can be carried around from case to case,
a tool that needs little knowledge of the local scene or the local needs to
apply . But it would be foolhardy to suppose that the easy tool or the cheap
tool or the tool we happen to have at hand must be the reliable tool .
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